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The years since World War II have brought rampant change to the structure of 
agriculture throughout most developed countries.  The United States has seen a dramatic 
decrease in the number of farms as well as production acres.  A combination of 
productivity enhancing technology and an influx of production from developing countries 
has resulted in an over saturation in commodity markets and left many U.S. farmers with 
empty bank accounts.  Multiple measures have been taken by farmers and policymakers 
to combat these phenomena and ensure survival. This study will consider the decision 
made by farmers to shift from full-time to part-time farming and the structural variables 
and constraints associated with such decisions.    
With empirical research regarding part-time farming beginning as early as 
Fugitt’s 1959 study, it is obvious that the current interest in the movement toward part-
time farming, as well as the phenomenon itself, is far from novel.  The significance of 
part-time farming, however, has become increasingly evident as the majority share of 
total household income generation is now a result of off-farm labor for farming 
households (Goodwin and Jones, 1986).  For the nearly forty-year period of 1954 to 1992 
farmers reporting off-farm labor in excess of 100 days annually jumped by almost 20% 
from 62 to 83 percent (US Census of Agriculture).  As the movement to part-time 
farming has escalated, its impetus has been of great interest.  The stimulus for off-farm 
work has frequently been thought to be a result of “small-farm operators struggling to 
continue a way of life and [being] forced by declining farm income or changing 
economic conditions to get off-farm work.” (Barlett, 1986).  Barlett further suggests that 
part-time farming was not merely a second-best alternative, but rather “the best of both 
worlds” in which farmers could avoid the risk associated with farming, but were not 
forced out of the occupation entirely.  Fuller and Mage (1976) concluded that a key 
reason for farmers participating in off-farm work is as a means of deceasing income risk 
via the distribution of income sources over two or more source of employment.   The 
ability of a farmer to acquire such work, however, is dependent upon the farm’s size and 
structure, as well as the availability of off-farm labor (Evenson and Huffman, 2001).      
Throughout the studies to date, farm characteristics and structure have been 
considered important determinants of off-farm labor.  In these studies, farm attributes are considered to be evaluated outside of the off-farm labor supply decision.  We, however, 
hypothesize that such decisions as farm size and diversification of livestock and crop 
production are not exogenous, but dependent upon off-farm labor attributes.  By 
examining off-farm work availability, the volatility of income on and off the farm, and 
wages associated with both types of labor effort, we will analyze the endogeneity 





  The focus of our analysis is on four important Corn Belt states—Iowa, Illinois, 
Indiana, and Ohio.  Our analysis utilizes county-level data collected from two sources.  
Information on off-farm labor effort and the structure and characteristics of farms was 
taken from the 1987, 1992, and 1997 Agricultural Censuses.  Detailed wage and income 
information was taken from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Regional Economic 
Information Service (REIS).  All monetary figures were converted to 1997 terms using 
the producer price index.   
  A number of variables are conceptually relevant to off-farm labor supply 
decisions.  In particular, variables representing the relative wages or implied productivity 
in alternative labor supply situations are relevant to how a farmer tends to allocate his or 
her time.  We measure such opportunity costs using implied farm wages (total farm 
income divided by number of farm proprietors) and the average earnings per job in the 
county.  Goodwin and Mishra demonstrated that risk averse agents may respond to 
differences in the level of income risk across alternative earning sources by adjusting 
their labor supplies.  In this light, we calculated a measure of the relative risk of income 
from agriculture and from employment off the farm. Specifically, we utilized annual data 
from the REIS dataset to calculate a coefficient of variation (CV) over the 10 years 
preceding each of the census years included in our study.  Age may also be relevant to an 
individual’s tastes and preferences regarding working off the farm.  We include the 
average age of farmers in each county as an explanatory factor.     Our primary interest in this study is on structural farm characteristics and their 
influence on (and by) off-farm labor supply decisions.  We consider three important 
variables relating to the structure of farms.  First, we utilized sales data from the 
Agricultural Census to calculate shares of total sales accounted for by various crop and 
livestock commodities.  Using these shares, we calculated a Herfindahl index as a 
measure of the diversification of farming in each county.  In order to facilitate 
interpretation, our measure of diversification is 1-H, where H is the Herfindahl index.  
Thus, a larger value corresponds to more diversification.  It is well-accepted that crop 
producers may have greater off-farm employment opportunities because of the seasonal 
nature of production whereas livestock product producers have relatively fewer 
opportunities for off-farm employment due to the fact that livestock operations generally 
run year-round.   Finally, the scale of agriculture would be expected to influence off-farm 
labor supply.  Producers on larger farms are less likely to pursue employment off the 
farm in that the on-farm effort required to operate a farm is most certainly influenced by 
the scale of the operation.   
  In addition to evaluating the extent to which these factors affect off-farm labor 
supply decision in the four Corn Belt states under consideration here, a primary goal of 
our analysis involves an evaluation of the extent to which farm structure may be 
endogenous or jointly determined along with off-farm labor supply decisions.  For 
example, is off-farm employment another way of diversifying the overall income flow for 
an individual farm?  If so, one might expect that our measure of farm diversification is 
influenced by the extent to which farmers are working off the farm.  Likewise, one might 
expect that the extent of diversification between crops and livestock undertaken by 
individual farms may be dependent upon whether the farmers are engaged in off-farm 
labor activities.  Finally, the size of an operation might be influenced by whether a farmer 
is engaged in off-farm employment activities.  A farmer that is working outside of the 
farm may be less likely to expand an operation.   
  These structural factors are always assumed to be exogenous in studies of off-
farm labor supply.  Such an assumption is generally justified on the grounds that these 
structural factors are relatively fixed in the short-run and thus are exogenous to labor supply decisions.  The usual approach to modeling off-farm labor supply involves 
estimation of a labor supply equation of the form: 
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where wi
f represents the farm wage, wi
o, represents the off-farm wage, Ci represents farm 
and operator characteristics relevant to labor decisions, and Xi represents other exogenous 
factors relevant to off-farm work.  Empirical applications typically make use of 
individual data (e.g., from surveys) and thus y, representing the degree of participation in 
off-farm labor markets, is often censored at zero (for individuals not working off the 
farm) or, in some cases, completely censored (when only the discrete work decisions can 
0 β be observed).  In our example, we utilize census data aggregated to the county level, 
such that ordinary least squares regression techniques are appropriate.   
  We have argued that farm characteristics may be endogenous to off-farm 
employment decisions.  To address such concerns, we adopt conventional two-stage least 
squares (2SLS).  Instrumental variables included values of the farm characteristics from 
the preceding Census (five years previous), the lagged wage variables, and the other 
exogenous factors included in the regression model.  Some method of evaluating the 
statistical significance of the differences between OLS and 2SLS estimate is needed.  We 
utilize a standard Wu-Hausman test for this purpose.  Under the null hypothesis that the 
OLS estimates are correctly specified, the Wu-Hausman test statistics, given by 
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is distributed as a chi-square random variable with degrees of freedom given by the 
number of variables being tested.  Note that  0 β represents the OLS estimates and  1 β  
represents the 2SLS estimates and V(.) is the appropriate covariance matrix.   
  Variable definitions and summary statistics are presented in table 1.  Two 
alternative measures of off-farm labor supply are considered.  The first considers the 
proportion of farmers in a county reporting 150 days or more of work off the farm during 
the preceding year.  This variable represents a high degree of involvement in the off-farm 
labor market (i.e., a level of involvement approaching full-time work).   The second 
measure is constructed by taking a weighted average of days worked off the farm.  The 
Census collects off-farm work effort data by specifying particular categories of effort—for example, work between 0-49 days per year, 50-99 days per year, and so forth.  We 
use the midpoint of each range as the implied days worked and construct the weighted 
average of days worked accordingly.
1  In our sample, the average farmer worked about 
77 days per year off the farm.  About 32% of the farmers worked more than 150 days per 
year off the farm.   
  Parameter estimates and summary statistics for the estimated off-farm labor 
supply equations are presented in Table 2.  The estimates are, in most cases, highly 
significant.  An informal comparison of the OLS and the 2SLS estimates suggests that the 
values are very similar to one another.  Indeed, in both cases, a Hausman test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that the OLS estimates are properly specified.  The results 
suggest that operators of more highly diversified farms tend to be more likely to pursue 
off-farm employment.  The parameter estimates are statistically significant in every case.  
This may reflect the fact that off-farm employment is yet another way of diversifying the 
income stream for a farmer.  As expected, a greater concentration of sales in livestock 
commodities is associated with a lower degree of off-farm labor market participation, 
though the effect is only significant in the 2SLS models.  This is consistent with 
expectations and the results of other studies that have determined that the nature of 
livestock production generally implies fewer opportunities for off-farm employment by 
livestock producers.   
  The age of producers is not significantly correlated with off-farm employment 
decisions.  This may reflect the rather limited variation in this aggregated measure in our 
data.  Off-farm labor supply is negatively affected by the size of farming operations.  
Larger farms imply less off-farm employment.  Again, this is consistent with expectations 
that operators of larger farms generally have fewer opportunities for off-farm 
employment.  The level and volatility of labor market wages and implied farm proprietor 
wages tend to have statistically significant influences on labor supply decisions.  
Counties with a higher degree of volatility in off-farm wages tend to have less off-farm 
labor market participation, though the effect is only significant in the case of the OLS 
estimates using the first (proportional) measure of off-farm work.  Conversely, on-farm 
earnings variability does not appear to be significantly related to off-farm labor market 
                                                 
1 Of course, such a construct is subject to measurement error.   participation.  This result is somewhat counter to the results obtained by Goodwin and 
Mishra( 1998) though our result is obtained for aggregate data and for a different sample 
of states and years.   
  Finally, as would be expected, the relative level of wages in each respective sector 
tends to have a very strong influence on off-farm labor market decisions.  Higher off-
farm wages in the preceding year tend to encourage more off-farm employment.  The 
effect is statistically significant in every case.  Conversely, higher on-farm wages tend to 
be associated with less off-farm employment.  These effects are what would be expected 
since higher wages in one sector will encourage agents to reallocate their labor supplies 
in favor of that sector.   
  Central to our analysis is the question of whether farm structure is endogenous to 
off-farm employment decisions.  Wu-Hausman tests of the OLS specification were 
considered for each of the alternative measures of off-farm labor supply.  In each case, 
the chi-square statistics and associated p-values support the OLS estimates and suggest 
that, at least for these data, there is little evidence that farm structure is endogenous to 
off-farm labor supply decisions.  This supports the typical specification adopted in the 
rather extensive literature that has considered models of the off-farm supply of labor.  For 
our sample of states and years, it would appear that farm structure is exogenous to labor 
supply decisions.   
 
Concluding Remarks 
The chief objective of this study is to investigate the extent to which farm 
structure is endogenous to off-farm labor supply decisions.  It is our initial hypothesis 
that farm structure and off-farm work decisions are jointly made.  The results of the Wu-
Hausman test, however, proved the hypothesis incorrect and the assumptions of previous 
economists accurate – the decision to work off the farm is made exogenously to farm 
structure.      
 
  Furthermore, the effect of three important farm structure variables on the off-
farm work decision is examined.  All three variables –diversification, crop or livestock 
specialization and farm scale were found to have a significant effect on part-time farming.  It appears that the more risk averse the producer, the more diversified he is.  As 
a result of his risk aversion, he chooses to further diversify his income through off-farm 
labor endeavors. Results found on livestock and crop specialization are consistent with 
those found by Evenson and Huffman (2001).  It seems that those farmers highly engaged 
in livestock production are more likely not to seek off-farm work, largely due to the 
constant on-site labor demand.  On the other hand, those producers focused on crop 
production are more likely to engage in off-farm work, because of the seasonality of such 
farming activities.  Finally, the study found a negative correlation between farm size and 
off-farm work.  It was determined that the greater the scale of production, the less likely 
the farmer was to be “part-time.” 
The effect of wage volatility on the decision to engage in off-farm labor was 
found to be significant in most cases.  The greater the variability in off-farm wages the 
less likely farmers are to hold work off the farm.  On-farm income variability, however, 
does not lead to an increase in off-farm work.  It was consistently found that higher 
wages in previous periods, on-farm or off-farm, resulted in a rise in the job market with 







Table 1.  Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Definition  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Proportion Working >150 Days  Proportion of farmers working more than 150 days per year  0.3248  0.1443
Average Days Worked  Weighted average of days worked off farm  76.7361  28.6542
Diversification Herfindahl  index  of diversification (1-H)  0.7452  0.0836
Livestock Sales  Livestock sales as a proportion of total farm sales  0.4071  0.1974
Age Average  farmer  age  51.1897  2.1968
Average Size  Average farm size (acres)  293.1445  99.6106
Volatility Off-Farm Earnings  CV of average off-farm earnings per job  7.4766  4.9997
Volatility of Farm Income  CV of average farm earnings per proprietor 74.5487  348.7540
Off-Farm Wages per Job (t-1)  Average earnings per job  22.7296  4.1810
Farm Income per Proprietor (t-1)  Average income per farm proprietor  0.0157  0.0172
  
Table 2.  Parameter Estimates of Off-Farm Labor Participation Models 
 
 
 OLS    2SLS   
Variable Parameter  Standard  Parameter  Standard   
   Estimate  Error     Estimate  Error    
            
Proportion Working More than 150 Days Off-Farm 
            
Intercept  0.0730 0.1414   0.1320  0.1479  
Diversification 0.2280 0.0646*  0.2208  0.0708* 
Livestock Sales  -0.0420 0.0276   -0.0495  0.0290* 
Age  0.0023 0.0023   0.0021  0.0023  
Average Size  -0.0002 0.0000*  -0.0004  0.0001* 
Volatility Off-Farm Earnings  -0.0023 0.0014*  -0.0016  0.0014  
Volatility of Farm Income  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000  0.0000  
Off-Farm Wages per Job (t-1)  0.0038 0.0013*  0.0034  0.0014* 
Farm Income per Proprietor (t-1)  -0.6817 0.2769*  -0.5070  0.2888* 
            
Hausman Test  7.30 [0.6061]           
Average Days Worked Off-Farm 
            
Intercept 44.1262 28.0525    54.2964  29.3067* 
Diversification 32.6207 12.8166*  32.6822  14.0392* 
Livestock Sales  -7.8926 5.4814   -9.9538  5.7550* 
Age  0.2683 0.4556   0.2293  0.4586  
Average Size  -0.0425 0.0095*  -0.0654  0.0146* 
Volatility Off-Farm Earnings  -0.4265 0.2745   -0.3109  0.2805  
Volatility of Farm Income  0.0018 0.0021   0.0020  0.0022  
Off-Farm Wages per Job (t-1)  0.7815 0.2646*  0.7103  0.2694* 
Farm Income per Proprietor (t-1)  -188.1390 54.9515*  -156.6090  57.2429* 
            
Hausman Test  5.03 [0.8315]           
 
An asterisk indicates statistical significance at the .10 or smaller level.  Numbers in 
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